Tuesday, May 3, 2011

GEORGIA - Georgia, independence difficult

These two decades were difficult for Georgia. In twenty years, not one has been quiet. From 1987-1988, we saw this coming the end of the Soviet Union and the independence of the republics. Even if the USSR still existed, the Georgians were able to create their National Front [and other organizations peaceful struggle for independence].

Yet, and this was our first mistake, we neglected something essential: while seeing that independence was certain we had failed to reflect the fact that we fell from the sky. Nobody wondered if this too easily gained independence was not an ambush. In 1988, a poll showed that 70% of residents of the capital, Tbilisi, wanted to remain within the USSR.

However, following the April 9, 1989 [when the Soviet security forces violently repressed demonstrations in favor of independence, leaving several dozen dead and wounded] sympathy for the Soviet power faded, and people do wanted one thing: get rid of this monster. The commission established at the time to investigate these tragic events has revealed that the order to promote the radical nationalist movements at the expense of more moderate currents had come to Moscow.

The Kremlin wanted to see Georgia become more radical and he succeeded. This radicalism has delivered the slogan "Georgia for Georgians", generating a series of ethnic and territorial conflicts [war against the Abkhazians and Ossetians, 1990 to 1993]. This radicalism has led to bloodshed.

Throughout these twenty years, the Georgian political life was marked by a veritable brainwashing, a result of a process begun during the Soviet period. Moscow wanted in Georgia, politics is impulsive, uncontrollable and exalted. We then made a second mistake: with the first president of independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, we opted for the creation of a "Caucasus House", an alliance between the South Caucasus [Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia] and North Caucasus [Russian].

This idea was premature. Moscow has reacted strongly, and Gamsakhurdia was soon to die [so sudden and suspicious, December 31, 1993, after being overthrown in the violent end of 1991 and returning in 1993 to attempt a coup that leads to a civil war]. We made the same mistake in August 2008 [by attacking South Ossetia, which resulted in a lightning war with Russia and Moscow's recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia].

As usual, our behavior, the behavior of the authorities, was impulsive and emotional, which has created difficulties not only for Georgia but also for the world. It shows that a country that takes care of its national interests evil eventually serve the interests of other states. The situation [in 2008] was controlled from abroad.

But we should know we stick to our national objectives. We must now have their primary objective to increase our influence, just like Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus. The future of our occupied territories [Abkhazia and South Ossetia] dependent on them. We must also lead to internal stability, and finally take the path of political thought.

Impulsive style that is poisoning us for twenty years should be exceeded, otherwise we will never solve any problem of foreign policy or economics. We must become more rational. So far, we have shown that most irrational of history do we allow. We must draw lessons. Nevertheless, these twenty years have not been lost.

We have always remained focused on the West and have come to exist in his eyes. Western countries are able now to consider alliances and partnerships with Georgia.

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