Three elections have helped to structure the final amorphous Russian political spectrum. The liberal bloc "tricolor" grouped around the "Democratic Russia" bloc opposed to "brown-red" dominated by the CPSU. The two-party system was finally crystallized, and the opposition Yeltsin-Gorbachev out of the "titanic struggle" to take the normal two-party system: when one of the "Titans" came out of the game, it simply means that another takes over.
Pronnoncer to the outcome of the struggle of blocks, it must reflect a process that has developed over the past three campaigns: the political sympathies are growing province and the results are found in the capitals of following year at the whole of Russia. The year 1991 showed that the odds of the CPSU in the capital is at its lowest.
The elections of 1989 and 1990 had more of an educational function that are decisive for the fate of Russia. The year 1991 has provided an enormous paradox: national and regional referendums (which from a formal point of view, have nothing to do with elections) eventually became the first real elections in the history of Russia.
The party system seems to have become part of history, even if it is a very recent history. `The Russian plebiscite of 1991 means the refusal to play the Zemsky Sobor (sort of general statements in Czarist Russia) as in 1989, or the Republic without parliamentary party, as in 1990. Attempts to create a representative democracy operates on the basis of a party system without fail.
It is now starting a presidential republic, that is to say, to create a branch of the Russian Independent executive power. In fact, voters have voted to determine which, Yeltsin or Gorbachev, take the reins of power in Russia (and USSR, by aggregating items to Gorbachev). Regardless of the qualities of the contenders, they were the first elections in a serious bipartisan.
A force play to democracy, there is gradually: the political spectrum is transformed into amorphous normal two-party mechanism. With the advent of the third elections in Russia, an opposition between two parties has been clearly drawn. On the left, the "lights" on the right "red-brown." The "lights", that is to say, the party formed around Boris Yeltsin on the base of the Democratic Russia movement, vote unequivocally for the liberal bourgeoisie.
The "brown-red" gather around the restored CPSU, and an equally unequivocal claim of "state power", the "socialist choice" and "original way of Russia." Between March 1989 and March 1991, the CPSU has suffered very serious transformations since originally an infrastructure of state leadership, it now appears in many key aspects, in the guise of a genuine political party in the fullest sense the term.
In 1989, feeling the need to legitimize his power, he triggered the mechanism of representative democracy. And in three stages, this mechanism has completely transformed the CPSU since 1989, the CPSU, as an institution of power, has had three high profile failures in elections. Change status from "new-type party" to the party short became a matter of survival.
The period covering the last three years was put to use by the Communists to actively seek - and find practically - a new ecological niche (and ideological). The delta-communist Democratic patriots "In the elections of 1989, members of the CPSU have won the majority of positions, but at the April plenum of the Central Committee, the results were nevertheless considered disastrous.
The threat was well understood: the vote was made on the principle of "non-cons apparatchik apparatchik" and a number of regional leaders of the CPSU had suffered a defeat. One felt instinctively that the results were unlikely to improve in the next election. The CPSU had gone to the evidence that the voices of voters were not won in advance, and was forced to submit to the 1990 elections, the semblance of a program, and worry a little bit of interests of voters.
That is to say, stand for election in the rules. After the 1990 elections, "Democrats" and "communists" have clearly understood that the idea of sovereign Russian state could become a decisive advantage in the struggle of parties being formed. Not wishing to lose this advantage, opponents shared the legacy of "patriots" dismissed without glory in 1990: the Communists took back the idea of empire, and the "democrats" that the Russian national independence.
The 1990 elections were held according to the triangular pattern: "Democrats - communists - patriots." The platform of "Democrats" proposed a program rather radical bourgeois liberal reforms, the platform of "patriots" is called the "specific way of Russia" and the notion of "empire" on the Platform of the CPSU, it was pure eclecticism: not too left, too right, socialist pluralism, and a socialist market too.
Create a stable electorate on such a basis was impossible: the voices of the CPSU in 1990 were, for many, gained from the inertia of the Russian deep. The Communist Party was absolutely needs a new ideology. He found her at the third elections in March 1991. The slogan became the CPSU "Conserve millennium a great power," and the Communists discovered thus their common ideological identity with the "patriots".
Reaching out to them, Ivan Polozkov decreed the country in danger, omitting the word "socialist". However, the situation has greatly complicated with the growth of democratic positions in parliament and the Russian government, following the 1990 elections. The opposition of the new Russian government at the Centre and separatist autonomous republics, demanded new ideological resources.
And the Democrats began to turn to look for them in patriotic symbolism. The tricolor flag, the double-headed eagle and the slogan "united and indivisible" united in a strange way the Democrats and the Communists in the same ideological space. In the struggle for the unity of Russia, Sergei Stankevich, a leading Democrat, ordered the Russian fatherland in danger.
For I. Polozkov, the homeland is the Union, Mr. Stankevich's Russia, but both faced with the breakup of their "all", they react the same way. Two types of patriots clash there: the patriot of the Empire cons celu! of the sovereign state. The plant produces an "effect of capital" Patriotism "imperial" is certainly not yet become the magic weapon of the Communists.
And that seems unlikely. The study compared results of three elections can reflect on trends in our politics and make some predictions. The central type of Russian political culture produces an "effect of capital." Moscow and Leningrad province to show the patterns of political behavior of mass, diffuse political trends, and Russia basically reproduced the results of its capital in the next election.
In the elections of 1989, future members include inter parliamentary body under the principle "every flock has its black sheep." But the Russian capitals share equally their votes between the forces of left and right ones. In 1990 the "fifty-fifty" Capitals postpones vote on the Russian general, while in Moscow and Leningrad, the "democrats" won the majority vote.
Finally, during the referendum in March 1991, Russia as a whole provides 70% of votes in the leader of the "democrats", Boris Yeltsin. The result of the capital last year has again postponed the provinces this year. This is again in capitals that the referendum on the renewal of the Union received the fewest positive responses: not more than 50%.
Extrapolating these results, we can assume that in the coming months, Yeltsin's slogan "a free Russia into a union of sovereign states" permanently occupy a dominant place in the minds of Russian citizens. Phenomenon that perfectly matches the logic of two-party: the party loses must be replaced.
And the party remained in power too long to leave, too. 
Pronnoncer to the outcome of the struggle of blocks, it must reflect a process that has developed over the past three campaigns: the political sympathies are growing province and the results are found in the capitals of following year at the whole of Russia. The year 1991 showed that the odds of the CPSU in the capital is at its lowest.
The elections of 1989 and 1990 had more of an educational function that are decisive for the fate of Russia. The year 1991 has provided an enormous paradox: national and regional referendums (which from a formal point of view, have nothing to do with elections) eventually became the first real elections in the history of Russia.
The party system seems to have become part of history, even if it is a very recent history. `The Russian plebiscite of 1991 means the refusal to play the Zemsky Sobor (sort of general statements in Czarist Russia) as in 1989, or the Republic without parliamentary party, as in 1990. Attempts to create a representative democracy operates on the basis of a party system without fail.
It is now starting a presidential republic, that is to say, to create a branch of the Russian Independent executive power. In fact, voters have voted to determine which, Yeltsin or Gorbachev, take the reins of power in Russia (and USSR, by aggregating items to Gorbachev). Regardless of the qualities of the contenders, they were the first elections in a serious bipartisan.
A force play to democracy, there is gradually: the political spectrum is transformed into amorphous normal two-party mechanism. With the advent of the third elections in Russia, an opposition between two parties has been clearly drawn. On the left, the "lights" on the right "red-brown." The "lights", that is to say, the party formed around Boris Yeltsin on the base of the Democratic Russia movement, vote unequivocally for the liberal bourgeoisie.
The "brown-red" gather around the restored CPSU, and an equally unequivocal claim of "state power", the "socialist choice" and "original way of Russia." Between March 1989 and March 1991, the CPSU has suffered very serious transformations since originally an infrastructure of state leadership, it now appears in many key aspects, in the guise of a genuine political party in the fullest sense the term.
In 1989, feeling the need to legitimize his power, he triggered the mechanism of representative democracy. And in three stages, this mechanism has completely transformed the CPSU since 1989, the CPSU, as an institution of power, has had three high profile failures in elections. Change status from "new-type party" to the party short became a matter of survival.
The period covering the last three years was put to use by the Communists to actively seek - and find practically - a new ecological niche (and ideological). The delta-communist Democratic patriots "In the elections of 1989, members of the CPSU have won the majority of positions, but at the April plenum of the Central Committee, the results were nevertheless considered disastrous.
The threat was well understood: the vote was made on the principle of "non-cons apparatchik apparatchik" and a number of regional leaders of the CPSU had suffered a defeat. One felt instinctively that the results were unlikely to improve in the next election. The CPSU had gone to the evidence that the voices of voters were not won in advance, and was forced to submit to the 1990 elections, the semblance of a program, and worry a little bit of interests of voters.
That is to say, stand for election in the rules. After the 1990 elections, "Democrats" and "communists" have clearly understood that the idea of sovereign Russian state could become a decisive advantage in the struggle of parties being formed. Not wishing to lose this advantage, opponents shared the legacy of "patriots" dismissed without glory in 1990: the Communists took back the idea of empire, and the "democrats" that the Russian national independence.
The 1990 elections were held according to the triangular pattern: "Democrats - communists - patriots." The platform of "Democrats" proposed a program rather radical bourgeois liberal reforms, the platform of "patriots" is called the "specific way of Russia" and the notion of "empire" on the Platform of the CPSU, it was pure eclecticism: not too left, too right, socialist pluralism, and a socialist market too.
Create a stable electorate on such a basis was impossible: the voices of the CPSU in 1990 were, for many, gained from the inertia of the Russian deep. The Communist Party was absolutely needs a new ideology. He found her at the third elections in March 1991. The slogan became the CPSU "Conserve millennium a great power," and the Communists discovered thus their common ideological identity with the "patriots".
Reaching out to them, Ivan Polozkov decreed the country in danger, omitting the word "socialist". However, the situation has greatly complicated with the growth of democratic positions in parliament and the Russian government, following the 1990 elections. The opposition of the new Russian government at the Centre and separatist autonomous republics, demanded new ideological resources.
And the Democrats began to turn to look for them in patriotic symbolism. The tricolor flag, the double-headed eagle and the slogan "united and indivisible" united in a strange way the Democrats and the Communists in the same ideological space. In the struggle for the unity of Russia, Sergei Stankevich, a leading Democrat, ordered the Russian fatherland in danger.
For I. Polozkov, the homeland is the Union, Mr. Stankevich's Russia, but both faced with the breakup of their "all", they react the same way. Two types of patriots clash there: the patriot of the Empire cons celu! of the sovereign state. The plant produces an "effect of capital" Patriotism "imperial" is certainly not yet become the magic weapon of the Communists.
And that seems unlikely. The study compared results of three elections can reflect on trends in our politics and make some predictions. The central type of Russian political culture produces an "effect of capital." Moscow and Leningrad province to show the patterns of political behavior of mass, diffuse political trends, and Russia basically reproduced the results of its capital in the next election.
In the elections of 1989, future members include inter parliamentary body under the principle "every flock has its black sheep." But the Russian capitals share equally their votes between the forces of left and right ones. In 1990 the "fifty-fifty" Capitals postpones vote on the Russian general, while in Moscow and Leningrad, the "democrats" won the majority vote.
Finally, during the referendum in March 1991, Russia as a whole provides 70% of votes in the leader of the "democrats", Boris Yeltsin. The result of the capital last year has again postponed the provinces this year. This is again in capitals that the referendum on the renewal of the Union received the fewest positive responses: not more than 50%.
Extrapolating these results, we can assume that in the coming months, Yeltsin's slogan "a free Russia into a union of sovereign states" permanently occupy a dominant place in the minds of Russian citizens. Phenomenon that perfectly matches the logic of two-party: the party loses must be replaced.
And the party remained in power too long to leave, too.
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