The war against terrorism has been hot, but was similar to the Cold War. The cold war world according to the teaching work inspired by George F. Kennan, who advised the containment of the Soviet Union. And Kennan was right, but not convinced everyone. The journalist Walter Lippmann criticized this policy because it found that the anti-Soviet alliance would involve the deal with undemocratic forces.
And Lippmann was right, as Kennan's own admission, although the blame for the militarization of containment, which is not proposed. The war against terrorism is like the cold war alliances against nature. A good example is Pakistan, a U.S. ally in Afghanistan and paradigm of the contradictions of the Bush administration, caught between the rhetoric of democracy and the imperatives of their war against terrorism.
India, a democracy, enjoying good press in the West, Pakistan, its rival, no. In India it is considered a success in Pakistan, a failure. Bernard Henry-Lévy has come to write that Pakistan is "the incarnation of pure evil." The Obama Administration, which has enterrrado the war against terrorism but must continue to fight against the scourge of terrorism, has raised now, after the death of Osama bin Laden, a dilemma.
On the one hand, is convinced that Pakistan is not a reliable ally. But then again, Pakistan is still necessary, especially if Washington is in a hurry to leave Afghanistan. U.S. strategy in the Cold War took hold of religion, as now remembered George Friedman, director of Stratfor, a think tank based in Washington, to highlight what Barack Obama says he will not do.
United States encouraged the Jewish resistance in the Soviet Union supported the Catholic Church in Poland, and backed Muslim guerrillas who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. What will Obama face the dilemma that poses Pakistan, a Muslim country? Or rethinking relations with its ally, which would deprive him of a fundamental base in the region, or swallow the toad and do see that Pakistani support for Bin Laden was not so.
Washington, as allies, it is not always located on the right side of history. An interesting case was that in the 1950's was the center of the Vietnamese Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem. Journalists Robert Scheer and Warren Hinckle was explained in 1965 in an article, "The Vietnam Lobby," which revealed how Madison Avenue advertisers, professional humanitarians, former leftists and Cardinal Spellman, if not the Department of State, sealed an unholy alliance to make the Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem the first President of the Republic of Vietnam, the Buddhist majority.
And the operation ended up as the string of dawn. Diem was assassinated in 1963, when he won a U.S. backed coup. The history of the alliance with the Pakistani military is no less bizarre. In early 1980, Muslim guerrillas defeated the Soviet invaders, thanks to triple pact between the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
The Islamists were faced then between them, which benefited the Taliban, nurtured by Pakistan. Then, the Taliban gave refuge to bin Laden. And after 11 September, the U.S. asked Pakistan to help in Afghanistan, what a dilemma. Or Pakistan refused to cooperate, which then benefit India, his great obsession, or left in the lurch at the Taliban, who had grown up.
The solution was neither one thing nor the other: Pakistan would work just as the United States, but would help the Taliban. Who risks more then a break? Does the United States, whose exit strategy in Afghanistan is impossible without an ally Pakistan? Or Pakistan, which fears for their safety? Pakistan has fought three wars with India, two over Kashmir and one in which Bangladesh lost.
So the military has fueled the movement to fight their wars with third brought, both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, a region disputed with India since independence. Pakistan fears that India feed the Baluchi and Pashtun separatism (the breadbasket of Taliban) that threaten him, but yesterday's attack to avenge the death of Bin Laden also shows that the genius Taliban refuses to return to the bottle.
The only sure thing for Washington and Islamabad, is that the death of Bin Laden has not changed geopolitical realities. 
And Lippmann was right, as Kennan's own admission, although the blame for the militarization of containment, which is not proposed. The war against terrorism is like the cold war alliances against nature. A good example is Pakistan, a U.S. ally in Afghanistan and paradigm of the contradictions of the Bush administration, caught between the rhetoric of democracy and the imperatives of their war against terrorism.
India, a democracy, enjoying good press in the West, Pakistan, its rival, no. In India it is considered a success in Pakistan, a failure. Bernard Henry-Lévy has come to write that Pakistan is "the incarnation of pure evil." The Obama Administration, which has enterrrado the war against terrorism but must continue to fight against the scourge of terrorism, has raised now, after the death of Osama bin Laden, a dilemma.
On the one hand, is convinced that Pakistan is not a reliable ally. But then again, Pakistan is still necessary, especially if Washington is in a hurry to leave Afghanistan. U.S. strategy in the Cold War took hold of religion, as now remembered George Friedman, director of Stratfor, a think tank based in Washington, to highlight what Barack Obama says he will not do.
United States encouraged the Jewish resistance in the Soviet Union supported the Catholic Church in Poland, and backed Muslim guerrillas who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. What will Obama face the dilemma that poses Pakistan, a Muslim country? Or rethinking relations with its ally, which would deprive him of a fundamental base in the region, or swallow the toad and do see that Pakistani support for Bin Laden was not so.
Washington, as allies, it is not always located on the right side of history. An interesting case was that in the 1950's was the center of the Vietnamese Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem. Journalists Robert Scheer and Warren Hinckle was explained in 1965 in an article, "The Vietnam Lobby," which revealed how Madison Avenue advertisers, professional humanitarians, former leftists and Cardinal Spellman, if not the Department of State, sealed an unholy alliance to make the Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem the first President of the Republic of Vietnam, the Buddhist majority.
And the operation ended up as the string of dawn. Diem was assassinated in 1963, when he won a U.S. backed coup. The history of the alliance with the Pakistani military is no less bizarre. In early 1980, Muslim guerrillas defeated the Soviet invaders, thanks to triple pact between the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
The Islamists were faced then between them, which benefited the Taliban, nurtured by Pakistan. Then, the Taliban gave refuge to bin Laden. And after 11 September, the U.S. asked Pakistan to help in Afghanistan, what a dilemma. Or Pakistan refused to cooperate, which then benefit India, his great obsession, or left in the lurch at the Taliban, who had grown up.
The solution was neither one thing nor the other: Pakistan would work just as the United States, but would help the Taliban. Who risks more then a break? Does the United States, whose exit strategy in Afghanistan is impossible without an ally Pakistan? Or Pakistan, which fears for their safety? Pakistan has fought three wars with India, two over Kashmir and one in which Bangladesh lost.
So the military has fueled the movement to fight their wars with third brought, both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, a region disputed with India since independence. Pakistan fears that India feed the Baluchi and Pashtun separatism (the breadbasket of Taliban) that threaten him, but yesterday's attack to avenge the death of Bin Laden also shows that the genius Taliban refuses to return to the bottle.
The only sure thing for Washington and Islamabad, is that the death of Bin Laden has not changed geopolitical realities.
No comments:
Post a Comment