The first Americans to set foot in the Arab world were not diplomats. The U.S. presence in the Middle East is long, just two years after Napoleon saw the pyramids, and began by trade, which basically was, as Michael Oren, the exchange of Caribbean rum for Turkish opium (Power, faith, and fantasy, 2006).
Americans risked being captured by pirates off the coast from Morocco to Libya and the answer was the blockade of Tripoli in 1801. The marines hymn begins: "Since the domains of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." Barack Obama's ancestors used, like Europeans, various formulas to solve the problem of the relationship with the Muslim Arabs.
Sometimes they seized trade, others of bribery, and when the speaker could not bring themselves to reason, opted for regime change. The modern Middle East was well. Washington entered the First World War in 1917, after demanding an open door policy to British and French, then, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire divided the region.
In Iraq, the oil dispute was resolved with a peculiar distribution: Great Britain, France, Netherlands and United States received 23.75% each and the remaining 5% were for Caloste Gulbenkian, the mediator. And after Iraq, that lost its oil, Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, and President Franklin Roosevelt forged an agreement still in effect: oil for security of the realm.
Since then, a goal of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has been and is, access to oil, a dash that has required more than a regime change. The other objective has been and is, the defense of Israel, whose alliance with the United States became unconditional in 1967, after the Israelis defeated the Arabs.
The first was regime change in Iran. In 1953, Mohamed Mosadeq democratically elected prime minister, was ousted in a covert U.S. and British. Mosadeq had nationalized the oil and London sent an M16 agent, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, to convince the White House that Iran was about to fall under Soviet control (British Foreign Policy Since the second world war, 1961).
And the ploy worked. United States took over Britain in the Middle East in two stages. Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal by circulating 60% of Persian oil, and Britain, France and Israel conspired against him. The result was a preemptive strike that Eisenhower did fail in 1956.
And London, humiliated, passed the baton to Washington, that the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, became the hegemonic power. The story, however, is not a straight line in the Middle East. The triumph of Khomeini's theocratic revolution in 1979 gave way to the resurgence of political Islam and terrorism, apocalyptic, though the story did not fail to be farfetched.
United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan funded the mujahideen against the Soviet troops who had invaded Afghanistan. And the operation was a success. But the Gulf War (1990-91), caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, broke the alliance between the U.S. and the oil kingdoms with supporters of holy war (jihad).
Osama bin Laden, the former ally, then pointed to the Saudi monarchy for calling the U.S. military presence in the country of the holiest sites of Islam, and then perpetrated the 11 September. Bush's response was the "freedom agenda", but the change of regime in Iraq has undermined the legitimacy of Washington.
Now, the objectives of U.S. diplomacy remain forever, even Barack Obama, to support the Egyptian popular protest, claims to be "on the right side of history." The oil slick protest Obama has put to the test. First, because the Egyptian military, concerned about their privileges, they still have to prove which side of history are.
And second, because Obama has warned of autocrats who can not stop with repression "hunger for freedom." So it is right that what is true for Egypt should be for Iran, that is, that regime change should be done in a democracy. But what is true for Egypt and Iran, will it be for Bahrain, on the coast is the V Fleet, and Saudi Arabia, the vast oil reserves of the West? 
Americans risked being captured by pirates off the coast from Morocco to Libya and the answer was the blockade of Tripoli in 1801. The marines hymn begins: "Since the domains of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." Barack Obama's ancestors used, like Europeans, various formulas to solve the problem of the relationship with the Muslim Arabs.
Sometimes they seized trade, others of bribery, and when the speaker could not bring themselves to reason, opted for regime change. The modern Middle East was well. Washington entered the First World War in 1917, after demanding an open door policy to British and French, then, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire divided the region.
In Iraq, the oil dispute was resolved with a peculiar distribution: Great Britain, France, Netherlands and United States received 23.75% each and the remaining 5% were for Caloste Gulbenkian, the mediator. And after Iraq, that lost its oil, Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, and President Franklin Roosevelt forged an agreement still in effect: oil for security of the realm.
Since then, a goal of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has been and is, access to oil, a dash that has required more than a regime change. The other objective has been and is, the defense of Israel, whose alliance with the United States became unconditional in 1967, after the Israelis defeated the Arabs.
The first was regime change in Iran. In 1953, Mohamed Mosadeq democratically elected prime minister, was ousted in a covert U.S. and British. Mosadeq had nationalized the oil and London sent an M16 agent, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, to convince the White House that Iran was about to fall under Soviet control (British Foreign Policy Since the second world war, 1961).
And the ploy worked. United States took over Britain in the Middle East in two stages. Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal by circulating 60% of Persian oil, and Britain, France and Israel conspired against him. The result was a preemptive strike that Eisenhower did fail in 1956.
And London, humiliated, passed the baton to Washington, that the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, became the hegemonic power. The story, however, is not a straight line in the Middle East. The triumph of Khomeini's theocratic revolution in 1979 gave way to the resurgence of political Islam and terrorism, apocalyptic, though the story did not fail to be farfetched.
United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan funded the mujahideen against the Soviet troops who had invaded Afghanistan. And the operation was a success. But the Gulf War (1990-91), caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, broke the alliance between the U.S. and the oil kingdoms with supporters of holy war (jihad).
Osama bin Laden, the former ally, then pointed to the Saudi monarchy for calling the U.S. military presence in the country of the holiest sites of Islam, and then perpetrated the 11 September. Bush's response was the "freedom agenda", but the change of regime in Iraq has undermined the legitimacy of Washington.
Now, the objectives of U.S. diplomacy remain forever, even Barack Obama, to support the Egyptian popular protest, claims to be "on the right side of history." The oil slick protest Obama has put to the test. First, because the Egyptian military, concerned about their privileges, they still have to prove which side of history are.
And second, because Obama has warned of autocrats who can not stop with repression "hunger for freedom." So it is right that what is true for Egypt should be for Iran, that is, that regime change should be done in a democracy. But what is true for Egypt and Iran, will it be for Bahrain, on the coast is the V Fleet, and Saudi Arabia, the vast oil reserves of the West?
- Argentina beat Brazil 2-1 at the Sul-Americano (07/02/2011)
- Brazil's PanAmericano, rivals in talks over sale (28/01/2011)
- Brazil's PanAmericano losses widen 65 pct-reports (03/02/2011)
- BTG Pactual to buy stake in Brazil's PanAmericano (01/02/2011)
- Argentina & Brazil post wins as the Sul-Americano U-20 (04/02/2011)
No comments:
Post a Comment