The Libyan uprising has given to President Nicolas Sarkozy an opportunity he watched a long time: the opportunity to lead an international mission risky that holds the promise of future glory. For General de Gaulle, founder of the Fifth Republic, the quest for greatness * was the first reason to be "a head of state.
His successors have fully shared this view and defended with tenacity and interest independence from France. But the idea that Sarkozy is the size differs from that of De Gaulle and Mitterrand. These presidents saw themselves as students of history, two men with a long-term national interest.
Sarkozy, himself, is a creature of the moment that has always lived by the news cycle. The risk makes the heart beat faster and sharpens his appetite. He first became known when he was mayor of Neuilly, a madman when fitted with a bomb had taken a kindergarten class hostage [May 1993]. Sarkozy entered the room, tried to persuade the gunman to surrender and had emerged before the cameras a child in her arms.
The crisis is his element. The risk appetite of the president has not always paid. Before becoming the nemesis of Muammar Gaddafi, he tried to return the colonel in the international community by inviting him to Paris in December 2007. This initiative earned him criticism from his own Secretary of State for Human Rights [Rama Yade] and was transferred to snub because of Libya's erratic behavior.
Worse, it was probably a fair exchange, after Gaddafi at the beginning of the year, had decided to release the Bulgarian nurses whom he held captive [since 1999 accused of infecting AIDS to Libyan children]. Among other tributes, the colonel had also extorted in return for the promise of 100 million euros of weapons and construction of a nuclear plant in his country.
Despite these overtures, the Libyan leader had subsequently refused to join the Union for the Mediterranean, a project dear to Sarkozy, arguing that it would ruin the unity of the Arab League. Of course, the French president had other motives than the disappointment demand urgent action against the Libyan dictator.
Sarkozy likes to invoke humanitarian considerations, which is perfectly legitimate, and "democratic values" shared with the rebels - not that we know exactly the position of stakeholders on the issue. But he also hopes to draw a veil over the turmoil that his government has shown at the beginning of the "Arab spring".
And it will also have to fight fiercely for reelection in 2012. His popularity is at its lowest. In these circumstances, a leader who led his country to war will always be suspected of seeking advantage in the polls. Sarkozy's rating has not undergone noticeable surge since French planes took off for Libya.
Gaullist grandeur remain in any case unattainable if the fighting in the desert does not go as planned. While the French aircraft have been the first to carry out bombing around Benghazi, even before U.S. cruise missiles can strike air defense sites forces loyal to Qadhafi. But in reality, the French and the British are supposed to provide the largest of the operation, lack the capacity to "force projection" of the United States.
And even if Gadhafi is reversed, the future of Libya will be determined by events that will follow, and France will face other interested parties to influence the process. In short, this speech could ultimately highlight the limits of the influence of France in the world, including in an area where it was once a dominant player.
There remains the question of the European Union, which Sarkozy's initiative has already proved problematic. Until now, the French president has always made fun of European sensibilities in most of its foreign companies and has often taken the wrong way with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hardly enthusiastic about the prospect of an operation in Libya.
Its tendency to act impetuously has perhaps settled his account at European cooperation in the short to medium term. But, conversely, the Libyan case has advanced the rapprochement between France and Great Britain. Prime Minister David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy seemed to make common cause, despite a temporary disagreement about the role of NATO.
But there is a difference that is worth to mention: Cameron sought a vote of confidence of the house before going to war. Sarkozy did not have to bother with such details: he controls the National Assembly. He simply acted according to his good pleasure *, like the Bourbons of old. Sovereignty is said to have the power to act in an emergency.
If so, military action in Libya is a striking demonstration of the sovereignty of Sarkozy on the great nation *. Sarkozy has exhibited extensively in requesting a Western intervention in Libya. He is now obliged to lead the mission to an end, even though it would put considerable strain French military capabilities. 
His successors have fully shared this view and defended with tenacity and interest independence from France. But the idea that Sarkozy is the size differs from that of De Gaulle and Mitterrand. These presidents saw themselves as students of history, two men with a long-term national interest.
Sarkozy, himself, is a creature of the moment that has always lived by the news cycle. The risk makes the heart beat faster and sharpens his appetite. He first became known when he was mayor of Neuilly, a madman when fitted with a bomb had taken a kindergarten class hostage [May 1993]. Sarkozy entered the room, tried to persuade the gunman to surrender and had emerged before the cameras a child in her arms.
The crisis is his element. The risk appetite of the president has not always paid. Before becoming the nemesis of Muammar Gaddafi, he tried to return the colonel in the international community by inviting him to Paris in December 2007. This initiative earned him criticism from his own Secretary of State for Human Rights [Rama Yade] and was transferred to snub because of Libya's erratic behavior.
Worse, it was probably a fair exchange, after Gaddafi at the beginning of the year, had decided to release the Bulgarian nurses whom he held captive [since 1999 accused of infecting AIDS to Libyan children]. Among other tributes, the colonel had also extorted in return for the promise of 100 million euros of weapons and construction of a nuclear plant in his country.
Despite these overtures, the Libyan leader had subsequently refused to join the Union for the Mediterranean, a project dear to Sarkozy, arguing that it would ruin the unity of the Arab League. Of course, the French president had other motives than the disappointment demand urgent action against the Libyan dictator.
Sarkozy likes to invoke humanitarian considerations, which is perfectly legitimate, and "democratic values" shared with the rebels - not that we know exactly the position of stakeholders on the issue. But he also hopes to draw a veil over the turmoil that his government has shown at the beginning of the "Arab spring".
And it will also have to fight fiercely for reelection in 2012. His popularity is at its lowest. In these circumstances, a leader who led his country to war will always be suspected of seeking advantage in the polls. Sarkozy's rating has not undergone noticeable surge since French planes took off for Libya.
Gaullist grandeur remain in any case unattainable if the fighting in the desert does not go as planned. While the French aircraft have been the first to carry out bombing around Benghazi, even before U.S. cruise missiles can strike air defense sites forces loyal to Qadhafi. But in reality, the French and the British are supposed to provide the largest of the operation, lack the capacity to "force projection" of the United States.
And even if Gadhafi is reversed, the future of Libya will be determined by events that will follow, and France will face other interested parties to influence the process. In short, this speech could ultimately highlight the limits of the influence of France in the world, including in an area where it was once a dominant player.
There remains the question of the European Union, which Sarkozy's initiative has already proved problematic. Until now, the French president has always made fun of European sensibilities in most of its foreign companies and has often taken the wrong way with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hardly enthusiastic about the prospect of an operation in Libya.
Its tendency to act impetuously has perhaps settled his account at European cooperation in the short to medium term. But, conversely, the Libyan case has advanced the rapprochement between France and Great Britain. Prime Minister David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy seemed to make common cause, despite a temporary disagreement about the role of NATO.
But there is a difference that is worth to mention: Cameron sought a vote of confidence of the house before going to war. Sarkozy did not have to bother with such details: he controls the National Assembly. He simply acted according to his good pleasure *, like the Bourbons of old. Sovereignty is said to have the power to act in an emergency.
If so, military action in Libya is a striking demonstration of the sovereignty of Sarkozy on the great nation *. Sarkozy has exhibited extensively in requesting a Western intervention in Libya. He is now obliged to lead the mission to an end, even though it would put considerable strain French military capabilities.
- Sarkozy 'threatened to punch French editor' (08/04/2011)
- Nicolas Sarkozy threatened to 'smash in' Franz-Olivier's face over Carla Bruni article (08/04/2011)
- I should smash your face in, Sarkozy tells author who suggested Carla be kept away from 'handsome men' (08/04/2011)
- Sarkozy calls multiculturalism a "failure" (11/02/2011)
- Campaigning politicos to Sarkozy: Please don't endorse us! (20/03/2011)
No comments:
Post a Comment