Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced March 22 that the foreign occupation forces would withdraw from four provinces and four cities. This transition will begin with the Kabul province (excluding the troubled district of Sarobi) and will expand to the provinces of Bamyan and Panjshir and several cities: Lashkar Gah, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Mehtarlam.
The transfer of responsibilities to the Army and Afghan National Police will be able to start within months, a process that must stretch through 2014. However, this is not a very big deal, since most of these areas are at peace, for the most part. In reality, the foreign forces present on site were not there out of necessity, but rather by inability to fight in real theaters.
The provinces and cities have chosen this particular they are away from areas of influence of Taliban draw their support from the Pashtun [40% of the population]. Two of the provinces concerned, the Bamiyan [center of the country] and the Panjshir [northeast], are bastions of Tajikistan and the city of Mazer-e-Sharif in the north, is the hideout of Abdul Rashid Dostum , ruthless Uzbek warlord, Herat city in western countries, is in the hands of regional warlord Ismail Khan, more exposed to attacks by its opponents as local Taliban, and Mehterlam is an island of peace in a is immersed in deep trouble.
So, we remain perplexed by the decision to include Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province infested with Taliban in the first phase of this transition. Perhaps is it a ploy to impress both the Afghan insurgents that the publics of countries participating in the intervention. These are indeed increasingly irritated and skeptical of the evidence showing that the occupation forces buy the warlords to keep them quiet.
Anyway, these "purchases of security" is nothing new. The occupants of the commonly practiced since the beginning of the intervention. And we will probably still more as whistleblowers that [such Wikileaks] will begin to reveal the dark combined armies and agencies occupying countries. But Karzai is also expected to stop doing his number and accept the realities of his country.
When he insists that the Taliban are Afghan refugees in Pakistan, it's just boring to banality and force is simply untrue. If there are no more attacks from terrorist groups in Afghanistan as he seems to believe, who are these men who fight the occupiers and Afghan forces across the country, not just south and east but also in remote regions of northern and western? If he had really been honest with himself, instead of being a mere lackey of the Americans, and particularly the CIA, Karzai would have imposed real action to members of the coalition military and his country would do it better than today.
A greater number of foreign forces from the beginning, a more energetic initial recruitment, training an army and national police in Afghanistan, a government able to decide on the use of international economic assistance, and especially a better representation of the Pashtun majority. All this would have helped to bring peace, security and stability in his country in war.
He had no doubt the possibility of becoming the De Gaulle of Afghanistan. He missed his chance at being a pawn in the hands of allies. He imagines what happens when an army full of Afghan Tajiks and Hazaras are present in the Pashtun areas after the transition? Karzai knows, however, the antipathy that Pashtuns and Tajiks are dedicated and religious hatred that persists between Pashtuns and Hazaras.
Instead of a diversion, he should now face the reality on the ground if he wants to save his country.
The transfer of responsibilities to the Army and Afghan National Police will be able to start within months, a process that must stretch through 2014. However, this is not a very big deal, since most of these areas are at peace, for the most part. In reality, the foreign forces present on site were not there out of necessity, but rather by inability to fight in real theaters.
The provinces and cities have chosen this particular they are away from areas of influence of Taliban draw their support from the Pashtun [40% of the population]. Two of the provinces concerned, the Bamiyan [center of the country] and the Panjshir [northeast], are bastions of Tajikistan and the city of Mazer-e-Sharif in the north, is the hideout of Abdul Rashid Dostum , ruthless Uzbek warlord, Herat city in western countries, is in the hands of regional warlord Ismail Khan, more exposed to attacks by its opponents as local Taliban, and Mehterlam is an island of peace in a is immersed in deep trouble.
So, we remain perplexed by the decision to include Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province infested with Taliban in the first phase of this transition. Perhaps is it a ploy to impress both the Afghan insurgents that the publics of countries participating in the intervention. These are indeed increasingly irritated and skeptical of the evidence showing that the occupation forces buy the warlords to keep them quiet.
Anyway, these "purchases of security" is nothing new. The occupants of the commonly practiced since the beginning of the intervention. And we will probably still more as whistleblowers that [such Wikileaks] will begin to reveal the dark combined armies and agencies occupying countries. But Karzai is also expected to stop doing his number and accept the realities of his country.
When he insists that the Taliban are Afghan refugees in Pakistan, it's just boring to banality and force is simply untrue. If there are no more attacks from terrorist groups in Afghanistan as he seems to believe, who are these men who fight the occupiers and Afghan forces across the country, not just south and east but also in remote regions of northern and western? If he had really been honest with himself, instead of being a mere lackey of the Americans, and particularly the CIA, Karzai would have imposed real action to members of the coalition military and his country would do it better than today.
A greater number of foreign forces from the beginning, a more energetic initial recruitment, training an army and national police in Afghanistan, a government able to decide on the use of international economic assistance, and especially a better representation of the Pashtun majority. All this would have helped to bring peace, security and stability in his country in war.
He had no doubt the possibility of becoming the De Gaulle of Afghanistan. He missed his chance at being a pawn in the hands of allies. He imagines what happens when an army full of Afghan Tajiks and Hazaras are present in the Pashtun areas after the transition? Karzai knows, however, the antipathy that Pashtuns and Tajiks are dedicated and religious hatred that persists between Pashtuns and Hazaras.
Instead of a diversion, he should now face the reality on the ground if he wants to save his country.
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