At a time when the situation worsens in Yemen, Washington should carefully weigh its future actions rather than follow his natural inclination would remain loyal to Ali Saleh. Several options are possible, some of which could be implemented in parallel. Encourage the departure of Ali Saleh. Since the beginning of the wave of protests Yemeni, U.S.
policy has focused primarily on promoting peaceful dialogue between Ali Saleh and opposition leaders to reform the government in respect of constitutional law. Moreover, Washington has urged Ali Saleh to oppose violence and protect the protesters face to the security services of the government and the factions supporting the regime.
However, given the scale of the protest movement and recent defections in the army, the U.S. should demand the resignation of Ali Saleh and support a peaceful political transition. If Washington has talked in the past harmonious political relations with the regime in order to facilitate operations against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the situation is now such that the Americans give the impression growing to rally behind Ali Saleh at the expense of the Yemeni people.
Visit Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has a strategic interest in the stability of Yemen and any shift in U.S. policy must take into account the Saudi interests. On several occasions throughout history, Saudi Arabia has used the "dollar diplomacy" to maintain relations of good relations with tribal leaders and influence the course of events in Yemen.
In the 1980s, Riyadh has used these relationships to fight the Marxist government of South Yemen. Given its recent military intervention in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia clearly seeking to take an active role in stabilizing its neighbors. Although his relationship with Ali Saleh have long been tense, the kingdom would be more willing to support if no other option presented itself.
That is why Washington should consult with the Saudis on actions to promote a smooth transition, while assuring them that U.S. calls for the resignation of Ali Saleh will not jeopardize the stability of Yemen. Reaching out to the opposition. The United States should engage with the main opposition groups, including tribal leaders and political parties to better understand their concerns and their demands for Yemen's post-Saleh.
This involves looking beyond the capital and meet the leaders of the governorates, including in areas where this is Al Qaeda. Washington must continue to promote peaceful development instead of a revolution by force of arms, presenting itself as a guarantor of the constitutional changes necessary to the formation of an inclusive government.
Even if these are the Yemenis who will decide the mode of governance of the country from Ali Saleh, the U.S. would have interest in playing an active role behind the scenes to ensure the government does not sink in regional disputes, ethnic , religious or tribal. To do this, the U.S. embassy in Sanaa should reach out to members of the JMP (Joint Meeting Parties, a coalition of opposition), Al-Islah Movement South to Houthis and tribal leaders.
Intensify the fight against Al Qaeda. The United States relies largely on the Yemeni security services for the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Many of these units are run by relatives of Ali Saleh or members of his tribe, so his departure could weaken their operational capacity, or reduce it to nothingness.
Accordingly, the United States should prepare to strengthen their training programs in Yemen. They also have an incentive to increase their ability to act unilaterally in the absence of power and failure of Yemenis in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the merger of elements of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in early 2009, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been more bellicose towards the Yemeni state.
This change in strategy by al-Qaeda may have prompted some plan members to actively fight the Islamist movement, while they tolerated it so far.
policy has focused primarily on promoting peaceful dialogue between Ali Saleh and opposition leaders to reform the government in respect of constitutional law. Moreover, Washington has urged Ali Saleh to oppose violence and protect the protesters face to the security services of the government and the factions supporting the regime.
However, given the scale of the protest movement and recent defections in the army, the U.S. should demand the resignation of Ali Saleh and support a peaceful political transition. If Washington has talked in the past harmonious political relations with the regime in order to facilitate operations against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the situation is now such that the Americans give the impression growing to rally behind Ali Saleh at the expense of the Yemeni people.
Visit Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has a strategic interest in the stability of Yemen and any shift in U.S. policy must take into account the Saudi interests. On several occasions throughout history, Saudi Arabia has used the "dollar diplomacy" to maintain relations of good relations with tribal leaders and influence the course of events in Yemen.
In the 1980s, Riyadh has used these relationships to fight the Marxist government of South Yemen. Given its recent military intervention in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia clearly seeking to take an active role in stabilizing its neighbors. Although his relationship with Ali Saleh have long been tense, the kingdom would be more willing to support if no other option presented itself.
That is why Washington should consult with the Saudis on actions to promote a smooth transition, while assuring them that U.S. calls for the resignation of Ali Saleh will not jeopardize the stability of Yemen. Reaching out to the opposition. The United States should engage with the main opposition groups, including tribal leaders and political parties to better understand their concerns and their demands for Yemen's post-Saleh.
This involves looking beyond the capital and meet the leaders of the governorates, including in areas where this is Al Qaeda. Washington must continue to promote peaceful development instead of a revolution by force of arms, presenting itself as a guarantor of the constitutional changes necessary to the formation of an inclusive government.
Even if these are the Yemenis who will decide the mode of governance of the country from Ali Saleh, the U.S. would have interest in playing an active role behind the scenes to ensure the government does not sink in regional disputes, ethnic , religious or tribal. To do this, the U.S. embassy in Sanaa should reach out to members of the JMP (Joint Meeting Parties, a coalition of opposition), Al-Islah Movement South to Houthis and tribal leaders.
Intensify the fight against Al Qaeda. The United States relies largely on the Yemeni security services for the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Many of these units are run by relatives of Ali Saleh or members of his tribe, so his departure could weaken their operational capacity, or reduce it to nothingness.
Accordingly, the United States should prepare to strengthen their training programs in Yemen. They also have an incentive to increase their ability to act unilaterally in the absence of power and failure of Yemenis in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the merger of elements of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in early 2009, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been more bellicose towards the Yemeni state.
This change in strategy by al-Qaeda may have prompted some plan members to actively fight the Islamist movement, while they tolerated it so far.
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